INTRODUCTION:

India and China are two great nations of the world. Both are located in Asia. China is the third or fourth largest country in the world in terms of geographical area and stands first as far as population is concerned. India is the seventh largest area but stands only second to China in terms of population. Both boast to be the home of some of the oldest civilisations. Both countries have maintained very close cultural and economic relations for centuries. Both have suffered due to colonialism. Though China was never under complete direct control of a foreign power, it suffered all the dents of imperialism. On the other hand, India remained under various foreign powers for several centuries. Both countries obtained complete independence almost together and both are considered to be next power centres of the world economy.

Both are large industrial centre and have attractive market, both are capable military power, and both have large pool of young manpower. China is asserting its might in the world stage. In the mean time, India is also doing everything, she'd be seen as a major global power. In this context, it gets very relevant to examine the relation of these two emerging super powers of the world.

India- Chinese relations can be traced back to several thousand years back. It has been cultural and economic as well. It is believed that the people of Indus Valley Civilisation had rich trade relations with their Chinese counterparts. They imported Jade from the Chinese traders and exported wheat and cotton.

Buddhism originated in India and reached to China through Buddhist monks and traders. Several Chinese scholars such as Fa Hsien, Sung Yun, Hsuan Tsang and I Tsing came to India and studied various aspects of Buddhism and other available knowledge. India being the birth place of Buddhism was almost a reverend place for common and intellectual Chinese folk. The famous Silk Road not only served as a major trade route between the two countries but also credited for facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India to almost entire East Asia.

In the medieval centuries, India was prone to foreign invasion from the barbaric tribes of central Asia as well as Islamic Perso- Arabic and Turkic invaders. Their frequent attacks over various parts of India began a long era of sufferings for Indian people. There was no political unity in India and thus the invaders got success in setting their empire in various parts of India. Further they settled in India and intermingled a lot with indigenous people.

The Europeans came to India and China as traders and made lots of profit. Soon they observed the ongoing political instability and started interfering in the local affairs. Later on, the British occupied the political control over entire India. Almost the same time, China also came under the influence of England, France, Russia, United States of America and Japan. As Indians suffered in hands of the British, the Chinese were exploited by the Japanese imperialism.

India got liberated on 15^th August 1947. The Communist Party of China ousted the nationalist Kuomintang Party and usurped power in January 1948. They declared the country as People’s Republic of China. India was one of the first nations to recognise the newly formed communist government of China. It was believed by Indians that two countries would shape a new Asia in coming years. The Indian policy towards the People’s Republic of China was based on the following beliefs:

First, there had been strong cultural and economic ties between India and China since Indus Valley Civilisation. China claimed to have the biggest population of the followers of Buddhism and India being the home of Buddha was a sacred and reverend land for the Chinese.

Second, the Chinese, alike Indians, had long experienced the sting of foreign imperialism. The Chinese had struggled a lot against the Japanese aggression and the Indians had great sympathy and respect for the quest of Chinese people.

Third, it was believed that in the long history of the relation between the two countries, the Chinese had never attacked India nor they would think to attack. Even if the Chinese dreamt, the impenetrable peaks of the Himalayas wouldn’t let the Chinese to move towards India.

Fourth, the Indian leadership including Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru and his most trusted lieutenant Defence Minister V Krishna Menon had been very sympathetic to the Communist movement of China and strongly believed that the Sino- India friendship was the core of the policy of Non –Alignment.

The India- China Relations – Early Phase: Before the Independence of India, one of the prominent leaders of Freedom Movement Jawahar Lal Nehru always emphasised on Sino – India friendship. The Chinese President Chang Kai Shek had made a visit of India in 1942 and garnered a great wave of sympathy from the Indians against the Japanese aggression of their country. Many leaders of India had leniency towards communism and thus, when Communist party captured power in China, it was widely welcomed in India. In December 1949, India became the first non communist nation to recognise the People’s Republic of China. In April 1950, India became the first non-socialist country to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and K.M. Panikker was appointed India's first ambassador to China.

Keeping the objections of United States of America aside, India supported China in the Korean War. India opposed the proposal which declared China the aggressor in United Nations. India was so concerned about its relations with China that it did not even attend a conference for the conclusion of an International treaty of peace with Japan held at San Francisco in 1949 because China was not invited. The treaty was attended by 49 nations. India even strove to become China's representative in matters related to world since China had been isolated from many issues.

India proposed the entry of People’s Republic of China in the United Nations Organisation. In that era, United States of America was not recognising the People’s Republic of China but the Kuomintang Government of Formosa (Taiwan) as the representative of China. India supported China on all platforms despite the fact that Chinese point of view towards India on many matters was not friendly. India openly criticised the American policy towards People’s Republic of China which were hindering the Chinese entry in major forums of world. Jawaharlal Nehru, driven by post-colonial solidarity considerations, continued to court the PRC even when the Chinese military began eliminating India’s outer line of defence by invading the then independent Tibet. As Tibet pleaded for help against the aggression, India opposed even a UN General Assembly discussion¹.

The Government of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China signed an agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet region on April 29, 1954 at Peking. The treaty was said to last for a period of eight years and was aimed at promoting trade and cultural exchange between two nations². The Government of Prime Minister Nehru surrendered India’s British Inherited Extra Territorial Rights in Tibet and acknowledged the “Tibet Region of China’’ without any quid pro quo. It was at this time when former Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru promoted the slogan "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai."(Indians and Chinese are brothers)

The Indian government ratified the treaty on 3^rd June 1954. The first formal codification of the principles of "Panchsheel" in treaty form was in this agreement of 1954. They were enunciated in the preamble to the Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet Autonomous Region of China and India", which was signed at Peking on 29 April 1954³. This agreement stated the five principles as:

(i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

(ii) Mutual non-aggression.

(iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

(iv) Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.

(v) Peaceful co-existence.

The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a state visit of India in June 1954. In the joint declaration released on that occasion emphasised on the "Panchsheel" - or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence - is first proposed in an India-China joint declaration.

In July 1954, Nehru wrote a memo directing a revision in the maps of India to show definite boundaries on all frontiers; however, Chinese maps showed some 120,000 square kilometres of Indian Territory as Chinese. On being questioned, Zhou Enlai, the Premier of People's Republic of China, responded that there were errors in the maps.

In October, 1954 Trade agreement between the two countries signed in New Delhi. In the same month in October 1954 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made a return visit of China. He was accompanied by his daughter, and later also Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi. Nehru described the visit as the "most important foreign mission of his life: A trip to China". It was also the first visit by a non-communist head of state since the creation of the People's Republic of China. The New York Times reported in its article⁴, "The six miles between city and airport were walled by unbroken banks of humanity, clapping, cheering and crying the inescapable Chinese slogan, "Long live peace" and Hindi Chini Bhai- Bhai."

Decades before the economic rise of India and China, the two nations came to define the region and beyond, Nehru met Chairman Mao Zedong, held talks with the first Chinese premier, Zhou En Lai, and visited Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou (Canton).

And although the visit seemingly cemented ties, building on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence agreed upon earlier that year, the two countries eventually were at war by 1962.

Jawaharlal Nehru met Chairman Mao Zedong during this visit. In a four-and-a-half hours of conversation, Nehru and Mao Zedong, the two strong-willed leaders tried to make sense of the post-Second World War world.

The minutes of the three meetings, that were made public by the Chinese side ahead of the 60th anniversary of the Bandung conference, on April 18, 2015, present a compelling picture of two equals trying to analyse changing power equations between the great powers. In this, Mao candidly admits that China’s economic development was "lower" than that of India and it would take "ten to twenty" years for industrial development to achieve tangible results. The records are available at the Digital Archive of the Wilson Center, Washington DC, provides unprecedented insights into the history of international relations and diplomacy.

In fact, within seconds of their first meeting on October 19, 1954 in Beijing, Mao gets straight down to business, talking about how the people of the East had been "bullied" by Western imperialist powers. "In spite of differences in our ideologies and social systems, we have an overriding common point, that is, all of us have to cope with imperialism," he says.

Both show themselves to be keen analysts of the international situation — exchanging notes on foreign affairs and the likely fallout of a possible third World War on their two countries, the region and the world.

Focus on imperialism:

A common enemy, imperialism, with a special focus on the United States, is a visible thread through all the three meetings, on October 19, October 23 and October 26 between Nehru and Mao. When Nehru suggests that India and China, which had a population of one billion between them, should play "more important" roles in Asia, an issue being discussed to this day, Mao responds: "But the United States does not recognise our two countries as great powers."Nehru, in turn, says: "The ruler (scale) that the United States uses to measure other countries will no longer be useful in future." When Nehru talks about the U.S. being both powerful and afraid, Mao remarks, "It is inconceivable that any country would march its troops into the United States."

Nehru doesn’t take a fully blanket view and points out to Mao that some Americans were against British and French colonialism, but adds that since the U.S. had "vested interests", it was nervous and afraid.

In response, Mao reveals that U.S. defence lines extending to South Korea, Taiwan and IndoChina had made China’s sleep "unsound".

Meeting in the backdrop of the Manila conference in September 1954 that set up the U.S.-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), Mao also appreciates the fact that India chose to stay away from the conference despite receiving an invitation.

Nehru says: "Although we are not powerful, we are not afraid of another country. Such an attitude on our part offends other countries. "Considerable time was spent on discussing the impact of the two World Wars and a possible third one, with Mao arguing that success for communist and nationalist parties came as a consequence of the two Wars.

"If a third world war is fought, the number of casualties will not be tens of millions, but hundreds of millions. China, so far, has no atomic bombs, and I do not know whether India has them. We have begun research in this respect; yet building the atomic bomb requires financial input. We may not have one for some time to come, "Mao says.

In effect, a full decade before China conducted its first nuclear test in September 1964; Mao had shared a critical piece of information with Nehru – that China had every intention of building a nuclear bomb. Intelligence agencies the world over would have given their right arm for such a piece of information, which Mao casually mentions to Nehru in conversation.

Mao is convinced that it was World War II that led to China’s independence – like in the case of the Russian Bolsheviks in World War One. "In China, we had fought for 22 years, yet…not until the end of World War II did we have the opportunity to stand up."

However, Nehru takes a different line — saying that he agreed with the Chairman (Mao) on most points, but had reservations on a few, which he then goes on to refer to. "…even without the Second World War, India would have still attained independence. As a matter of fact, when the Second World War began, India already had almost attained independence," he says, adding that the War was used as a "pickaxe" by Britain, prolonging its rule.

Mao also took a curious line on war and "tension". He argues: "I think that not only war, but even a tense situation will benefit and at the same time harm those who create tension…a tense situation would awaken the people and make them prepare to resist pressure."

While discussing the possibility of another war, Nehru feels that with every passing year, the chances of war were receding. "My guess is that if 15 years pass without a war, the possibility of war will be very remote. Not that it is the people would have changed, but the weapons will have developed to such an extent that nobody dares to use them."

Interestingly, Mao remarks that if another war were to break out, no one could "sink" China (or India) to the ocean floor completely.

In their third and last meeting, the Chairman and Nehru discuss their "differences", with Mao referring to a Chinese saying, "to seize somebody’s pigtail", and then stating that India and China don’t do that — seize each other’s pigtails.

At another point, Mao says there was no need for India and China to "quarrel", which has Nehru responding: “Sometimes we have differences, but we do not quarrel.''

India and China in Afro- Asia Summit, Bandung:

Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai again met during the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955. At Bandung, Zhou Enlai, made an enormous impression on Asia that was deeply suspicious of the new communist rulers in Beijing. Zhou, who set out to win new friends in the region, certainly succeeded with Pakistan. Bandung was also where the Hindi-Chini Bhai- Bhai began to fade, as Zhou ran rings around Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was viewed as overbearing and condescending by the Chinese leader.

The personality clash was only part of the problem. Nehru presumed he was speaking for the whole of Asia and denounced the US-led military blocs that many Asian nations had joined voluntarily. Zhou, in contrast, refused to talk down to the rest of Asia and focused on probing the weaknesses of American alliances in the region, including that between the US and Pakistan. Zhou told the Bandung conference that communist China posed no threat to the region and was eager to develop good relations with its Asian neighbours. Pakistan seized the moment at Bandung to lay the foundation for a practical partnership with Beijing in two very productive meetings between Zhou and Pakistan’s PM, Mohammad Ali Bogra. Bogra assured Zhou that Pakistan’s membership of US alliances — the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) was about securing its interests vis-a-vis India, and not directed against China. Addressing the political committee of the Bandung conference, Zhou said he had reached an understanding with Pakistan on matters of ''collective peace and cooperation''. He also said Bogra had assured him that Pakistan would not support any aggressive American action against Beijing.

Deterioration in Relationship: Towards War:

As Sino-Pak relations entered a positive phase, New Delhi and Beijing began to drift apart at Bandung. Trouble broke out in Tibet soon after and culminated in the 1962 war between India and China. The unresolved political and territorial contradictions between India and China could no longer be obfuscated with the rhetoric of Asian solidarity. By the early 1960s, Indian diplomats had to work hard to scuttle the second Afro-Asian summit that China and Pakistan sought to convene in 1964.

In 1956, on a trip to India to celebrate the Buddha's Birthday, the Dalai Lama asked the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, if he would allow him political asylum should he choose to stay. Nehru discouraged this as a provocation against peace, and reminded him of the Indian Government's non-interventionist stance agreed upon with its 1954 treaty with China⁵.

In January 1957 Premier Zhou Enlai visited India and received an honorary doctorate from Calcutta University. In September 1957 Indian Vice-President Dr S Radhakrishnan visited China. In April 1960 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made another visit of India.

At the outset of the 1959 Tibetan uprising, fearing for his life, the Dalai Lama and his retinue fled Tibet with the help of the CIA's Special Activities Division⁶, crossing into India on 30 March 1959, reaching Tezpur in Assam on 18 April.

Chairman Mao Zedong felt humiliated by the reception Dalai Lama obtained in India when he fled there in March 1959. Tensions increased between the two nations when Mao stated that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was caused by Indians. China's perception of India as a threat to its rule of Tibet became one of the most prominent reasons for the Sino-Indian War.

In October 1959, India realised that it was not ready for war after a clash between the two armies at Kongka Pass, in which nine Indian policemen were killed; the country assumed responsibility for the border and pulled back patrols from disputed areas.

Various conflicts and military incidents between India and China flared up throughout the summer of 1962. On July 10, 1962, around 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post at Chushul and used loudspeakers to convince the Ghurkhas that they should not be fighting for India.

Border disputes resulted in a war between the People's Republic of China and India on 20 October 1962⁷. The border clash resulted in a defeat of India as the PRC pushed the Indian forces to within forty-eight kilometres of the Assam plains in the northeast. It also occupied strategic points in the Aksai Chin and Demchok regions of Ladakh, before declaring a unilateral cease-fire on 21 November. It claimed that it withdrew to twenty kilometres behind its contended line of control. India disagreed with the claim⁸.

In 1967, there were two more conflicts between Indian and Chinese forces at their contested border, in Sikkim. The first conflict was dubbed the "Nathu La Incident"⁹ took place on September 11, and the other the "Cho La Incident" on October, 1¹⁰. In both, Chinese suffered heavy defeats.

Restoring India-China relations:

The relation between two nations remained dormant until 1975 when the Chinese sent their Table-Tennis team to take part in a tournament held in India. In August 1976, India and China restored relations to ambassadorial level after a fifteen-year gap. In 1977, Janta Party formed government under Prime Minister Morarji Desai. In almost same period, the reins of leadership changed in China. Both nations felt to break the ice between their relationships. In February 1979, Indian External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China and held talks with his Chinese counterpart Huang Hua. However during this visit of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his Chinese hosts had an unpleasant, but not entirely unanticipated, surprise for him. Disregarding the close and friendly relations between India and Vietnam, China's supreme leader Deng Xiao Ping sent his army across his country's borders to invade Vietnam. To add insult to injury, Deng proclaimed that the invasion was meant to teach Vietnam a "lesson" in much the same manner as China had taught India a "lesson" in 1962¹¹. Indian Vice President B.D. Jatti represented India on the 29^th National day of People’s Republic of China. In June 1981, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited India.

In 1980, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved a plan to upgrade the deployment of forces around the Line of Actual Control. India also undertook infrastructural development in disputed areas. In 1984, squads of Indian soldiers began actively patrolling the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. In the winter of 1986, the Chinese deployed their troops to the Sumdorong Chu before the Indian team could arrive and built a Helipad at Wandung. Surprised by the Chinese occupation, India's then Chief of Army Staff, General K. Sundarji, airlifted a brigade to the region. Chinese troops could not move any further into the valley and were forced to away from the valley. By 1987, Beijing's reaction was similar to that in 1962 and this prompted many Western diplomats to predict war. However, Indian foreign minister Narayan Dutt Tiwari travelled to Beijing to negotiate a mutual de-escalation¹².

In December 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made an official visit to China, the first high-level bilateral visit in 34 years. The two sides issued a joint communiqué that stressed the need to restore friendly relations on the basis of the Panchsheel. India and the People's Republic of China agreed to achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute. Rajiv Gandhi signed bilateral agreements on science and technology co-operation, establish direct air links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic consultations between foreign ministers. A joint working group on the boundary question and a joint economic group are established set up on economic and scientific co-operation, and on the boundary issue. The latter group was to be led by the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs.

In December 1991, Premier Li Peng made an official visit to India and held talks with Prime Minister P. V. Narsimha Rao. Progress was also made in reducing tensions on the border via mutual troop reductions, regular meetings of local military commanders, and advance notification about military exercises. In July 1992, Sharad Pawar visited Beijing, the first Indian Minister of Defence to do so. Consulates reopened in Mumbai and Shanghai in December 1992.

In May 1992 Indian President R Venkatraman visited China, the first head of state visit from India to China. In September 1993, PM Narasimha Rao also visited China. An agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control in the India-China border area was signed. In 1993, the sixth-round of the joint working group talks was held in New Delhi but resulted in only minor developments. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Premier Li Peng signed a border agreement dealing with cross-border trade, cooperation on environmental issues (e.g. Pollution, Animal extinction, Global warming, etc.) and radio and television broadcasting. A senior-level Chinese military delegation made a goodwill visit to India in December 1993 aimed at "fostering confidence-building measures between the defence forces of the two countries." The visit, however, came at a time when China was providing military support to Burma and reportedly set radar installations on Burma's Coco Islands, which border India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands, caused concern in India.

In January 1994, Beijing announced that it not only favoured a negotiated solution on Kashmir, but also opposed any form of independence for the region. Talks were held in New Delhi in February aimed at confirming established "confidence-building measures", discussing clarification of the "line of actual control", reduction of armed forces along the line, and prior information about forthcoming military exercises. China's hope for settlement of the boundary issue was reiterated. In July 1994, Double taxation avoidance agreement was signed. In 1995, talks by the India-China Expert Group led to an agreement to set up two additional points of contact along the 4,000 km border to facilitate meetings between military personnel. The two sides were reportedly "seriously engaged" in defining the McMahon Line and the line of actual control vis-à-vis military exercises and prevention of air intrusion. Talks were held in Beijing in July and in New Delhi in August to improve border security, combat cross-border crimes and on additional troop withdrawals from the border. These talks further reduced tensions¹³.

In November-December 1996, President Jiang Zemin visited India, the first head of state visit from China to India. An agreement on confidence building measures in the military field along the line of actual control in the India-China border area was signed.

Sino-Indian relations hit a low point in 1998 following India's nuclear tests. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes declared, "in my perception of national security, China is enemy No 1…and any person who is concerned about India’s security must agree with that fact", hinting that India developed nuclear weapons in defence against China's nuclear arsenal¹⁴. In 1998, China was one of the strongest international critics of India's nuclear tests and entry into the nuclear club. During the 1999 Kargil War China voiced support for Pakistan, but also counselled Pakistan to withdraw its forces.

Sino- India Relations in 21^st Century:

The XVII Karmapa, Urgyen Trinley Dorje, who was proclaimed by China, made a dramatic escape from Tibet to the Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim on January 5, 2000. Chinese officials were in a quandary on this issue as any protest to India on the issue would mean an explicit endorsement on India's governance of Sikkim, which the Chinese still hadn't recognised. In 2003, China officially recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim as the two countries moved towards resolving their border disputes. In June 2003, Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. Declaration on principles for relations and comprehensive cooperation was signed and a special representative mechanism was established to explore the framework of a boundary settlement from the political perspective. Both countries nominated their representatives for the border talks¹⁵.

In 2004, the two countries proposed opening up the Nathula and Jelepla Passes in Sikkim. 2004 was a milestone in Sino-Indian bilateral trade, surpassing the US$10 billion mark for the first time. In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Bangalore to push for increased Sino-Indian cooperation in high-tech industries. Wen stated that the 21st century will be "the Asian century of the IT industry."Regarding the issue of India gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Wen Jiabao initially seemed to support the idea, but had returned to a neutral position¹⁶.

In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in 2005, China was granted an observer status. While other countries in the region were ready to consider China for permanent membership in the SAARC, India seemed reluctant. In 2006, China and India re-opened Nathula pass for trading after a gap of 44 years. Despite these, in November 2006, both countries had a verbal spat over claim of the north-east Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that China was occupying 38,000 square kilometres of its territory in Kashmir, while China claimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its own¹⁷.

In 2007, China denied the application for visa from an Indian Administrative Service officer in Arunachal Pradesh. According to China, since Arunachal Pradesh is a territory of China, he would not need a visa to visit his own country¹⁸. Later in December 2007, China reversed its policy by granting a visa to Marpe Sora, an Arunachal born professor in computer science as India threatened to return the favour by granting attached visas to Chinese citizen of Tibet region¹⁹. In January 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China to discuss trade, commerce, defence, military, and various other issues. In October 2009, Asian Development Bank formally acknowledging Arunachal Pradesh as part of India approved a loan to India for a development project there. Earlier China had exercised pressure on the bank to cease the loan, however India succeeded in securing the loan with the help of the United States and Japan. China expressed displeasure at ADB²⁰.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to India in December 2010 and at a conference in Bengluru he stated, "India and China are two very populous countries with ancient civilisations, friendship between the two countries has a time-honoured history, which can be dated back 2,000 years, and since the establishment of diplomatic ties between our two countries, in particular the last ten years, friendship and cooperation has made significant progress²¹."

India hosted the BRICS summit in 2012 at New Delhi, where the Chinese President Hu Jintao told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that "it is China's unswerving policy to develop Sino-Indian friendship, deepen strategic cooperation and seek common development" and "China hopes to see a peaceful, prosperous and continually developing India and is committed to building more dynamic China-India relationship". Other topics were discussed, including border dispute problems and a unified BRICS central bank²².

In response to India's test of an Agni-V missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to Beijing, the PRC called for the two countries to "cherish the hard-earned momentum of co-operation"²³.

A three-week standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in close proximity to each other and the Line of Actual Control between Jammu and Kashmir's Ladakh region and Aksai Chin took place in May 2013. The standoff was defused just before just before visit of Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid to China where he said that both countries had a shared interest in not having the border issue exacerbate or "destroy" long-term progress in relations. The PLA withdrew in exchange for an Indian agreement to demolish several "live-in bunkers" 250 km to the south in the disputed Chumar sector²⁴.

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made his first state visit to India in May 2013 in a bid to increase diplomatic co-operation, to cement trade relations, and formulate border dispute solutions. Six months later Chinese objected to the Indian President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, and particularly his speech calling the area an "integral and important part of India"²⁵. In September, 2014 the relationship took a dip as the People’s Liberation Army entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Chumar sector²⁶. The next month, Indian Army Chief General V. K. Singh said that China and India had come to a "convergence of views" on the threat of terrorism emanating from Pakistan.

In May 2014, Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) came to power in India and Narendra Modi Became the Prime Minister. It was the first majority government in India after Rajiv Gandhi led government of 1984-1989. Modi, as the Chief Minister of Gujarat had made few visits of China and had praised their modal of development in various public meetings in India. Chinese President Xi Jinping was one of the top world leaders to visit New Delhi after Narendra Modi took over as Prime Minister of India in 2014 and Modi welcomed him in Sabarmati Ashram, Ahmadabad in his home state Gujarat. The pictures of the two leaders seated on a swing and talking in great mood was a scene of delight²⁷. Modi made a return visit of China in May 2015. President Xi Jinping received Modi in Xi'an, his home town (akin to Xi's Ahmadabad trip last September, the home town of Modi), before official talks in Beijing.

China–India standoff in Doklam:

The warmth between India and Chine soon faded away as on June 16, 2017, PLA troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as Bhutan²⁸. On June 18, 2017, around 270 Indian Army Soldiers, with weapons and two bulldozers, entered Doklam in support of the Royal Bhutan Army to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the road. China accused India of illegal intrusion into its territory, across what it called the mutually agreed China-India boundary, and violation of its territorial sovereignty and UN Charter. India accused China of changing the status quo in violation of a 2012 understanding between the two governments regarding the tri-junction boundary points and causing "security concerns", which were widely understood as at its concerns with the strategic Siliguri Corridor²⁹. On June 28, Bhutan issued a demarche, demanding China to cease road-building in Doklam and maintain the status quo. The Minister of External Affairs of India, Mrs Sushma Swaraj said that if China unilaterally changed the status-quo of the tri-junction point between China-India and Bhutan then it posed a challenge to the security of India. China repeatedly said that India's withdrawal was a prerequisite for meaningful dialogue. On July 21, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj replied that for dialogue, both India and China must withdraw their troops³⁰. When China threatened India of dire consequences, Indian Defence Minister Arun Jaitley reminded that India of 2017 was very different and not the 1962 India anymore³¹.

On August 2, 2017, China published a document entitled, (Indian border forces cross the border between China and India...The facts...and the position of China), claiming that Indian border forces had illegally crossed the border between China and India and detailed China's position on the matter³². The document said that China notified India regarding its plan to construct road in advance "in full reflection of China’s goodwill". The Ministry of External Affairs of India did not confirm or deny the statement when asked if India had received the notification?

On 28 August 2017, China and India reached a consensus to put an end to the border stand-off. Both of them agreed to disengage from the standoff in Doklam. It is believed that China withdrew also because it wanted the purposed BRICS summit in Xiamen a success which was to be held between 3-5 September 2017. Had China not recalled its troops, India might boycott the summit. The internal election in the Chinese Communist party was also a concern for president Xi Jinping.

During the two-day informal summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping in Wuhan in Central China's Hubei Province, on April 28, 2018 India and China agreed for the first time to implement a joint economic project in war-torn Afghanistan. In the joint statement Indian and Chinese officials announced that both countries would identify the projects and work out the modalities of cooperation. The areas of health, education and food security was expected to be given priorities³³.

China is constantly building naval bases in Indian Ocean to encircle India through its policy called ‘string of Pearls’. China lures the neighbouring nations of India by offering them huge amounts of loan for their infrastructural projects. Once they get in trap of the Chinese debts, China twist their muscle and bargain for strategic gains in forms of commercial or military facilities. China has built bases in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Maldives, Seychelles, and Somalia. China is constantly equipping its all weather friend Pakistan with its military hardware and providing safety to action against the terrorist groups on world platforms. China has vetoed many times the Indian proposal in UN to declare the Lashkar-e- Taiba chief Masood Azhar³⁴. China is building China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with a huge investment of $62 billion from its Xinjiang province to Gwadar port of Baluchistan in Pakistan³⁵. India opposes the CPEC as it passes through Pakistan occupied areas of Kashmir that is the violation of Indian sovereignty³⁶. China defends the CPEC saying that its stand on the Kashmir issue has no direct linking to the project³⁷. China strongly opposes India’s candidature of permanent seat in UN Security Council as well as membership of Nuclear Suppliers Group.³⁸ Now China has started providing military weapons to Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives as well. China wants these countries out of Indian sphere of influence. The recent Chinese backing of anti-democratic actions in Maldives is a shameless example of its greedy policies.

CONCLUSION:

China has almost acquired the status of a great power. India is desirous. China has rivalled United States of America at almost all major global platforms. India is searching its birth all around. The single party rule, lack of opposition, lack of freedom of expression and speech, controlled press and above all overwhelming dominance of Han population which believes in the supremacy of Chinese in all spheres of life helps all goals being achieved without much confrontation. Whereas India is a multiethnic, multicultural, multi-party democracy with all components of check and balances which hardly allow the implementation of any programme without much opposition. Yet India is progressing with highest growth rate among major economies. Its vibrant democracy and almost good track on the front of human rights makes India more acceptable among rest of the world. If China is known for hard power, India relies on its soft power. Both need each other. The muscle flexing of China might afraid its smaller neighbours but India is all capable to handle the Chinese adventurism. Numerical superiority may be in side of China but the Independent observers weigh Indian military mush better. And India also posses nuclear power and can hit any part of China through land, air and water. Now, when China is experiencing downfall in its economic growth,³⁹ it can’t afford to lose the most prosperous market i.e. India. India’s biggest competitor and trade partner is China today. India’s trade deficit of $61 billion with China refuses to shrink as India is unable to export more manufactures and less primary and intermediate goods to China and amount to $12.5 billion. In words of Prime Minister Narendra Modi "Asia and the world will have a better future when India and China work together with trust and confidence"⁴⁰. This wasn’t a new realisation on Modi’s part because he along with other leaders of India has always known that the Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant command enormous power in the world arena because of their huge population and because they are the two fastest growing economies in the world.

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Received on 01.10.2018 Modified on 29.11.2018

Res. J. Humanities and Social Sciences. 2019; 10(2):720-728.

DOI: 10.5958/2321-5828.2019.00119.0